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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
AR'THUR W. F AIRCLO,UGH, FRED
FAIRCLOUGH, AN'THONY M.
CRUS, THOMAS CRUS, and JOHN
CRUS, doing business as FAIRCLOUGH & CRUS,
Plaintiffs .and Respondents,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUN'TY, LAM·ONT B.
GUNDERSON, WILLIAM G. LARSON and EDWIN Q. CANN·ON, SR.;
ROAD COMMISSION OF UITAH,
C. TAYLOR BURTON, FRANCIS
FELTCH, ERNES'T H. BALCH,
WILLIAM J. SMIRL and WE'STON
E. HAMILTON,
Defendants and Appellants.

·Case No. 9140

BRIEF OF RE'S'P'ONDENITS

S'TATEMENT OF

FA~C'T'S

Respondents agree with appellants' statement
of facts. We also agree that a suit against the State
Road Commission and against Salt Lake County is
in essence a suit against the State of Utah.
1
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STATElVIENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT DID NO'T ERR IN DENYING APPELLAN'TS' MO'TION TO DISMISS.
POINT II
IF THE SUPREME C·OUR'T HOLDS THAT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS A DEFENSE TO THE AC·TION
FOR DAMAGES, THEN A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
SHOULD I8SUE.

ARGUMEN'T
P·OINT I
'THE CO·URT DID NO'T ERR IN DENYING APP·ELLAN'TS' MO'TION TO DISMISS.

Respondents' property is adjacent·to and abuts
3900 South Street in Salt Lake County, Utah, on
the north side thereof. The Road Commission or
Salt Lake County or ·both of them .lowered the
grade of 3900 South to a point where it has completely destroyed responden·ts' , ingress and egress.
Respondents' property. is now- completely inaccessible and by reason of the destruction of the ingress
and egress to the property, it ·has depreciated substantially in value.
'The following constitutional provisions require
consideration in determining the question before
the court.
Article I, Section 22
Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation. ·
2
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Article I, Section 26
The provisions of this constitution are
mandatory and prohibitory unless by express
vvords they are declared to be otherwise.
Article I, Section 11
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due cot1rse of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay.
The Utah Supreme Court in the cases of Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 90 P. 395 and
Hempste~ad v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 261, 90 P.
397 has held that lowering of the grade of a street
is a damaging within the meaning of that word as
it is used in Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution.
The precise question that is now before this
court has been considered by the courts of last
resort of many states.
It is our position, (1) that the provisions of
Article I, Section 22 are "self-executing" and that
the legislature cannot deprive a property owner of
the right granted thereunder by its failure to enact
a statute providing for a remedy to recover damages
when private property is injured for a public use,
and (2) that said constitutional provision constitutes a consent by the 'State of Utah that it may ·be
sued for such damages.
I

3
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Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 505.
The State of California constructed a subway in the
street in such a manner that it substantially interfered with plaintiff's right of ingress and egress to
his property. The case involved an action against
the State of California to recover damages by reason
of the depreciation in the value of the property. The
California Supreme Court held that the action could
be maintained against the state and in so doing
quoted 18 Am. Jur., p. 1028 as follows.
"Under such a constitutional guarantee,
the right to recover in an action in damages
for consequential injury has been sustained
in a number of cases. It is held that the constitutional provision is self-executing; that is,
that eve11 if a statute has not been enacted
providing a remedy for damage for the construction of public works, the landowner is
entitled to enforce his constitutional right to
compensation in a common law action.
The court further said,
"'That the constitutional provision that
property cannot be tal\:en or damaged for a
public use constitutes a consent ·by the state
that it may be sued for damages."
R.enninger v. State, 70 Ida. 190, 213 P. 2d 911.
This was an action by a landowner against the
State of Idaho to recover compensation for flooding
of plaintiff's land that resulted from raising the
grade of a highway which in turn obstructed the
natural flow of the river causing it to overflow on
plaintiff's land. The trial court sustained a demurrer
4
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to plaintiff's complaint and the Supreme Court
reversed.
The Constitution of Idaho provided,
"'The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation
therefor."
It should be noted that the Idaho Constitution
merely prohibits a taking of private property. It
does not prohibit the damaging as well as the taking
like the Utah Constitution does. T'he Supreme Court
of Idaho held that the constitutional provision that
private property may not be taken without paying
just compensation is self-executing and that it waived the immunity of the state to be sued. In so holding the court said,
"'This provision of the constitution, therefore, waives the immunity of the state from
suit, and if the states takes the property without condeming, the landowner, to give full
force and effect to the provision of the constitution as self-executing, must be entitled
to sue therefor and such are the universal
holdings of the courts which have occasion to
consider this specific point; that is, where
the state has taken private property for public lise without paying for it, and tries to
avoid paying by claiming immunity."
Logan County v. John Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194
P. 621. This was an action by a landowner against
the county to recover damages that resulted when
the county constructed a bridge that caused water
to ·back up on plaintiff's land. The court held such
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an action could be maintained against the county.
B~acich

v. Board of Control, 128 P. 2d 191. This
is another case where the California Court followed
the holding in Rose v. State, supra, and held that
a landowner could maintain an action against the
state to recover consequential damages. The court
reaffirmed the holding that the constitutional provision against the taking or damaging of property
without just compensation is self-executing and constitutes the consent of the state to be sued in such
proceedings.
The Arizona Supreme Court in the case of In
Re Forsstram .et ux, 44 Ariz. 472, 38 P. 2d 878, held
that the constitutional ~provision in Arizona against
the taking or damaging of property without just
compensation was not self-executing, and it further
held that if the plaintiff's property is damaged as
distinguished from being taken that there was no
right of action that could be maintained against the
state inasmuch as the legislature had failed to provide any means by which ·to enforce the rights given
by the constitution.
The ~supreme Court of Arizona in the case of
County of Mohave v. Chamberlain, 78 Ariz. 422, 281
P. 2d 128 ( 1955), overruled the holding in the Forsstrom case and in so doing the court said,
'"The overwhelming majority of courts to
which such a question has been presented do
not agree with this holding. Ros.e v. State, 19
6
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Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 505; Morgan v. Board
of S~tpervisors, 67 Ariz. 133, 192 P. 2d 236.
We cannot but agree with the logic therein.
As the Supreme Court of California so well
stated in the Rose case, ''The legislature by
statutory enactment may not abrogate or deny
r.. v-i2'ht granted by the constitution. And it
follows as a logical conclusion that a right
constitutionally granted cannot be taken away
by the failure of the legislature to act.'

*

*

*

"We hold that the ruling in the Forsstrom case to the effect that the provisions of
Article 2, Section 17 concerning compensation
for property taken or damaged for public use,
are not self-executing is erroneous and is
therefore expressly overruled. It follows that
any language therein to the effect that compensation for "damaging" for public use could
not be made without legislative enactment is
likewise erroneous."
The Arizona court followed the same rule laid
down in the County of Mohave case, supra, in the
case of State Vo £,eeson, 84 Ariz. 44, 3'23 P. 2d 692.
Layman v. Beeler, 113 Ky. 221, 67 S.W. 995.
This case involved an action by a landowner against
the county to recover consequential damages to his
property by reason of the change of grade of a highway. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the
complaint and dismissed the action. In reversing
the· trial court, the Supreme Court said,
''The provision of. t?e ~onstit~tion ~hich
requires that the municipality taking private
property for public use 'shall make just com7
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pensation for the property taken, injured or
destroyed by them,' necessarily implies that, if
the corporation should fail to make the compensation before the taking or injuring, it is
liable therefore after such taking or injury,
and that, if it will not pay the damages an
action is necessarily authorized to be instituted against it; for it would be idle to give
to a party a right without a re1nedy to enforce
it. We therefore conclude that, if the facts
alleged in the petition be true, that is, that
the improvement of the highway in question
did so impair the plaintiff's adjacent lands
and their value as to damage him, that was a
taking and injury within the contemplation
and meaning of the constitution, and the language of that section necessarily implies a
right upon the part of the citizen to maintain
his action against the county to recover such
damages, if not otherwise settled.''
The Kentucky Supreme Court reaffirmed its
holding in Layman v. Beeler, supra, in the case of
Cranley v. Boyd County, 266 Ky. 569, 99 S.W. 2d
737. The Court said,
"Not as an exception to the rule of sovereign immunity of the county from liability
for torts, but as a constitutional requirement,
though a negation, is the rule that a county
is legally answerable for trespass in the taking or injury of a citizen's property. It arises
from the a'bsolute terms of Section 13 of the
Constitution of Kentucky, declaring that no
man's property shall ·be taken or applied to a
public use without his consent and without
just compensation being paid him and of Section 24·2 providing that those corporations
or individuals invested with the privilege of
8
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taking· private property for public use shall
make just compensation for property 'taken,
injured or destroyed by them'. The interpretation and application of these provisions in
relation to counties, since Layman v. Beeler,
113 Ky. 221, 67 S.W. 995, (as previously applied to cities), has been that they must respond and make compensation to the owner
of property a~tually appropriated or of property abutting on roads and highways which
has been injured or dan1aged in a manner
regarded as a taking.''
C·ampbell v. Arkans.as State Highw~ay Commission, 183 Arlc 780, 38 S.W. 2d 753. This was an
action by a landowner to recover damages from the
State Highvvay Commission that resulted when the
grade of the highvvay was changed and the owner's
ingress a11d egress obstructed. The trial court entered a judgment for the defendant and the Supreme
Court on appeal reversed. The Supreme Court used
the following language in holding that the landowner could maintain the action against the Highway Commission,
"There is nothing in the contention that
the Arkansas State Highway Commission
could not be sued in this kind of action. * * *
When the grade of the highway was raised
by the construction of the bridge and its approaches to the damage of the lots of abutting
owners such act brought the case within the
guarantee of the cl~use of the constitution
above referred to. Neither the state nor any of
its agencies is exempt from the constitutional
guarantee that private properties shall not
9
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be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation therefor. * * * It is true
that the Arkansas State Highway Commission
did not institute condemnation proceedings
against the property owners, but the property
owners had a right to maintain this action.
It was a remedy given them under the common
law for a trespass or injury to their real estate. The right existed under the provision of
the constitution; and, where the statute provides no adequate remedy, it may be enforced
by an action for damageso County of Chester
v. BrovJer, 117 Pa. 647, 12 Atl. 577; Swift &
·Comp,any v. Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 52
SoE. 821. In the case last cited it was held
that a constitutional provision that private
property shall not be damaged for public use
without compensation is self-executing, and
the common law will furnish an appropriate
remedy in the absence of one expressly given
'by constitution or statute. This view is sustained by our own cases above cited and is in
harmony with the views expressed in them."
See Le,eman v. Williams et al, 301 Ky. 729, 193
S.W. 2d 161 (1946) for a later Kentucl\:y case to the
same effect. For additional cases on the same problem see Jacobsen v. State of North Dakota, D.epartment of State Highways .et al, 278 N.W. 662, 68
N.D. 25'7; State Road Department of Florida et al,
v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868; Little v. B1tr
leigh County, 82 N.W. 2d 603 (1957) (North Dakota); ·Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway
Dept., 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842.
In the instant· case it should be kept in mind
10
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that plaintiffs' action for damages is against Salt
Lake County and the Road Commission. Plaintiffs
do not seel\: to recover damages from the Commissioners of Salt Lake County nor from the Road
Commissioners. The Utah Constitution prohibits the
"taking· or damaging" of private property for public
use without paying just compensation. The constitution also provides that the provisions therein contained a~e "mandatory and prohi bitory". 'The constitution clearly gives a private property owner a
right to compensation if his property is damaged for
a public use. Where there is a right there must be
a remedy. We urge this court that the remedy lies
in holding that the constitutional provision quoted
above is self-executing and that it constitutes a consent on the part of the state to be sued and is a
waiver of sovereign immunity in this type of case.
1

Appellants cite State of Utah v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 94 Utah '384, 78 P. 2d 502, as
authority for the proposition that sovereign immunity is a defense in a case of this type. The case
does not so hdld. A careful reading of it demonstrates
that the holding of the case was that the individual
road commissioners may be enjoined from constructing public works that will caus.e injury or damage
to an owner's property, unless the road commissioners cause just compensation to 'be paid to the owner
for such damage. As stated before we do not 'believe
11
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that the Fourth Judicial District Court case is a
holding against the position that we now take, however, if it is viewed by the court as authority against
our position, we earnestly and sincerely urge this
court to overrule that decision just as the Arizona
Supreme Court did, and adopt the rule that has
been adopted by every court of last resort that has
had occasion to consider the question, namely; that
the constitutional provision, Article I, Section 22,
is self-executing and that it constitutes a consent on
the part of the State of Utah to be sued. The order
of the trial court denying appellants' motion to dismiss should be affirmed and the case should be remanded to the lower court for trial.
POIN'T II
IF THE SUPREME COUR'T HOLDS THAT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS A DEFENSE 'TO THE ACTION
FOR DAMAGES, THEN A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
SHO·ULD ISSUE.

If this court should hold that sovereign immunity is a defense to plaintiffs' action for damages
against the Road Commission and Salt Lake County,
then we think the plaintiffs are entitled to have the
order of the trial court recalling the alternative
writ of mandamus set aside and an order of this
court directing the trial court to enter an order
making the writ of mandamus permanent as against
12
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the individtlal Road Cornmissioners and the individtlal County Commissioners.
55 C.J.S. Section 178 (b) p. 339 states the rule
as follovvs,
''1VI:a11damus is an appropriate remedy to
c~)~:1p:l officials taking private property for
street and highway purposes to comply with
the stat1xtes governing such matters. It will
lie to compel the institution of condemnation
proceedings where land or rights therein have
been taken for street or highway purposes or
injured tl1ereby v1ithout compensating the
owner; and to compel the proper authorities
to proceed v1ith the determination of the damages to property owners occasioned by the construction or opening of a street or highway,
a change of grade or other hig'hway improvementso''
'The cases of People v. Kingery, 369 Ill. 28'9, 16
N~ E. '2d 761; Riggs v. State Road Commissioner,
120 W. Va. 298, 19'7 S.E. 813; Hardy v. Simpson,
Road Commissioner, 180 W. V. 440, 190 'S.E. 680;
State v. Anderson, 220 Minn. 139, 19 N.W. 2d 62;
Grunewald Va City of Chicago, 371 Ill. 528, 21 N.E.
2d 739; Emanuel v. Sproat, 136 N.J. Laws 18'3, 54
Atl. 2d 760; App~al,achian Electric Company v. Sawyers, 141 W. V. 769, 93 S.E. 2d 25; B~aird v. Johnson, 230 Ia. 161, 297 N.W. 315; Anderlik v. State
Highw~ay Commission, 240 Ia. 919, '238 N.W. 2d
605, involve the question of whether mandamus. is
a proper remedy to compel the individual commissioners to institute proper proceedings so that the
1

13
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amount of just compensation can be determined
and ordered paid. The cases cited hold that mandamus is a proper remedy.
Springville B~anking Comp,any v. C. T~aylor Burton, et ,al, Case No. 9066, is now pending in this
court. 'The brief of appellant in that case contains
an excellent discussion of the cases where mandamus
was held to be a proper remedy under circumstances
similar to the case at bar.
The trial court's order should be affirmed. To
hold otherwise is to hold that the legislature by nonaction can deprive an owner of a right granted by
the constitution. This court had no difficulty in the
case of C~ampbell Building Company v. State Road
Commission, 9'5 Uta'h 242, 70 P. 2d 857, in holding
that the enactment of Section 2'7-2-1, U.C.A., 1953,
constituted consent on the part of the state to be sued
on written contracts. We cannot see why the constitutional provision, Article I, Section 22, should
not be given at least the dignity of a legislative
enactment.
If the court should hold that sovereign immunity is a defense to this action, then an order should
be made directing the trial court to issue a writ of
mandamus and make the same permanent.
Respectfully su'bmitted,
McBROOM & HANNI
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
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